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What Does China Face In The Future?

A radio discussion over WGN and the Mutual Broadcasting System

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
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Broadcast continuously since 1934 by Northwestern University



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What Does China Face In The Future?

MR. BUCHANAN: What does China face in the future?

MR. McGOVERN: The future of China is dark. We must realize that the Chinese Communists are Communists, and for the Communists to conquer China means to place China behind the Iron Curtain.

MR. HART: I expect China to revert to her normal historical style of revolution. China, in my opinion, is about to break up politically, the Communists controlling the larger, richer area, the remainder of the country coming under the domination of the individual war lords as in the 1920's. The Chiang regime is finished.

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MR. BUCHANAN: The confused situation in China, dramatized by Madame Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the United States, is being discussed everywhere in the nation. People wonder if we must do everything possible to save China from Communism or if more aid to China will just be wasted.

You seem to feel, Mr. McGovern, that a China behind the Iron Curtain is a dangerous thing. Do you think that situation is imminent?

MR. McGOVERN: Yes, I think very much so. Actually I am not at all surprised. Last year I was in China, Japan, and Korea making a study of the situation. I reported to Congress in March of this year. I was rather interested to note that I said that China was in such a very desperate situation that the central government might well collapse within a year. Unfortunately, I have been proved only too accurate in some of my predictions.

MR. BUCHANAN: When you, on the other hand, speak of revolution do you mean a shooting war or just a political upheaval, Mr. Hart?

'Revolution Is Characteristic of Chinese History'

MR. HART: I mean that cycle of revolutionary breakup of China with the pieces coming together again that has been characteristic of Chinese history for the last 3,000 years. China, with its lack of communication, its different languages, its different types of people, has shown that rhythm throughout its history, a rhythm of small states growing together, coming under one domination, either foreign or Chinese, and then in the course of time breaking of its own weight or from the accumulation of problems. Then a new dynasty is formed after a period of revolutionary chaos such as China is going through now. In fact I look upon what China is going through now as perfectly normal in the Chinese history.

MR. BUCHANAN: I think this whole situation was brought to focus by the visit of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. What do you think of her arrival in this country, Mr. McGovern?

MR. McGOVERN: I think, of course, that it is obviously a last attempt—to me the last stand—made in order to get some aid, effective aid to the central government. I think she will fail. I think there is no doubt of that. Neither the President nor the Secretary of State nor Congress is in a position

to give any immediate big scale aid to China. To that extent I see that she is not going to be too successful in her attempts. I feel rather sorry in one sense—not that I have so much admiration for her—but I am sorry to see the situation in China because I think it is bad for American national interests. I think some of the present situation is the fault of corruption and inefficiency and wastefulness of the National government. On the other hand, I think that part of the situation is due to our attitude in the years immediately following the war in 1945 and 1946.

MR. HART: When do you feel that our policy became chaotic and had no form or direction? Don't you think it was about 1943 that we began to use bad judgment in handling the Chinese situation?

MR. McGOVERN: Yes, I think that is true. I think even worse was the situation in 1945 and '46 at the time when the shooting war was over and General Marshall went over there. As much as I admire General Marshall—he was my former boss, incidentally—I feel he made a great mistake at this time. He told the Chinese government that it would not be able to get any aid of any sort unless it took the Chinese Communists into the Chinese government. And at the same time we were telling European nations they would get no aid if they took the Communists in.

MR. HART: In other words, we were taking one policy in Europe and another one in China. I never could understand how Marshall made that report on the situation.

'Chinese Communists Take Orders from Kremlin'

MR. McGOVERN: Yes, I am sorry to say I happen to agree with you. I think Marshall is a great soldier and a very good Secretary of State, but I think his judgment is far from perfect. I think it took him a long time—the same as it is taking other people a long time—to understand that the Chinese Communists are Communists. By Communists I mean, of course, Marxist Communists in cahoots with the Kremlin. Several times, I know that you, too, Mr. Hart, have had close contact with the Communists and agree with me that the conversations I have had with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai and Chu Teh convinced me that some of our people are quite wrong. The Chinese Communists are not far-looking liberals, they are not agrarian reformists—that is a means to an end—but they are convinced of Marxism.

MR. BUCHANAN: These people whom you mention, who are they?

MR. McGOVERN: They are the three great leaders of the Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung is No. 1, and Chu Teh and Chou En-lai really control the Communists.

MR. HART: And they are really under the control of Moscow.

Of course, I believe the whole situation was indefinite until about 1939. I have never been able to find out how much Russia really controlled until 1939 except in that period when Borodin and Gellin and some of the others visited Chiang when he was marching down the Yangtze Valley and preparing for the conquest of North China.

If we follow Chiang's personal history, we find it is a very tortuous one. I think he always climbed to power over the backs of the Chinese Communists, and, when he thought he had gained all he could out of them and he

saw it was to his own good not to be a Communist any more, he turned on them with purges that have never been advertised. Like Stalin and Hitler, he ruthlessly started to crush the very party that put him into power.

MR. BUCHANAN: Before 1939 these Communists were not directly concerned with the Kremlin?

MR. McGOVERN: It is a little bit more complicated than that. Actually the Chinese Communist Party was always associated with and interested in Marx. It had some contacts with Russia, but the contacts were very little and more indirect until this period of 1938 and '39. I remember when I was making investigations in '38 that I was still a little dubious as to how Communistic these groups were. They were inclined toward Communism, but from long conversations I had with the people I don't think they were wholehearted Communists. However, in 1943 they were Communists in the sense of being the agents of Communism.

MR. HART: I am surprised that our government didn't recognize that in our proceedings with Marshall. I think Stilwell knew the situation and understood it very well. I always felt that we should have listened to Stilwell and not to Chiang and his petition to our government.

MR. McGOVERN: Another important factor is the suppression of the Wedemeyer Report. When General Wedemeyer was in China last year something still could have been done. I think the suppression of the Wedemeyer Report is one of the things that put us back a year.

MR. BUCHANAN: What is the general situation in China today? First, let's take the government and Chiang's position there. Do you think he is growing weaker, Mr. Hart?

'Chiang Government Is Finished'

MR. HART: I think he has lost the confidence of all parties in China. I feel myself that he is on the verge of resigning or being forced out. I don't see how he can hold on very much longer, particularly if Madame Chiang goes back, as I expect her to, empty-handed.

MR. BUCHANAN: What sort of government, then, might come in?

MR. HART: To me the Communists already control the richest part of China, controlling the mines and the great plain of Manchuria, now getting down to the Yangtze, the industrial regions. The remainder of China, if Chiang resigns, I feel, will fall into the hands of the generals who have armies behind them, and China will break up into what we call the *tuchunate*, the rule of the war lords as followed the death of Yuan Shih-kai in 1916. What will happen thereafter is for the future to decide.

MR. BUCHANAN: Then there is more than one war lord force, more than one army?

MR. McGOVERN: Yes, as a matter of fact, as Mr. Hart has indicated, China is not and has not been for years a single entity, whether we call it a national government or not. The National government has been a coalition with the Chiang group on top, but always supported by a number of semi-independent war lords, such as Lung Yun of the Province of Yunnan. The real question therefore is whether the Communist group will be able to take

over the whole of China. I agree with Mr. Hart that many portions, especially the western and southwestern parts of China, may well remain semi-independent for an indefinite period.

MR. BUCHANAN: You speak of independent states. What is the economic situation in China today?

MR. HART: Her industries were smashed up by the Japanese. These industries were developing under the rule of Chiang. That was the reason the Japanese struck when they did. They realized that if China continued to industrialize, continued to build roads, continued to develop railroads, that it would be too late. Japan has spent all her efforts to undermine and destroy that industrialization.

Now with Russia coming in, with our consent, to carry off everything in Manchuria, coming in to control the mines and the industries of Manchuria, I feel that China is in a bad way economically. She is just on the rocks because the part that is left in the hands of the Nationalist government is not the industrialized part, and is not the part that is producing.

MR. BUCHANAN: We have often heard about the size of China and the diversity of population. How important do you think that is in this problem, Mr. Hart?

Size of China Is Major Factor

MR. HART: I consider it is tremendously important, particularly in view of the fact that there is practically no transportation in China. There was never more than a few thousand miles of railway. Most of those lines are now shut down, and the remainder has deteriorated. That is why I feel that the Communists are not going to go ahead as fast in the future as they have in the past. It is going to take them years—perhaps 25, 30 years—to consolidate their gains. Meanwhile much can happen in the world.

MR. McGOVERN: Only on one point here will I disagree with you. When you have a determined, ruthless minority, such as your Communist hierarchy in the Communist party in China and elsewhere, it is able to accomplish a great deal in a surprisingly short time.

MR. HART: Yes, but in the countries that Communists have conquered so far there have been small compact groups. There haven't been any groups that comprised practically one-quarter of the entire population of the world. Here we have Russia on the one hand reaching out to control Europe; on the other hand she is reaching out across the thousands of miles of central Asia to control a quarter of the population of the globe. I fall back on the old Chinese proverb, "You can't catch two frogs with one hand."

MR. McGOVERN: I wish I could be as optimistic. I am afraid I can't be for many reasons. In the first place we have seen how Russia, step by step, has been able to secure satellite state after state—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Estonia, Latvia—and each and every time it seems she will be satisfied. We thought that was true in Japan, in Germany, and Italy. Russia is like the snowball that gets larger and larger as it rolls downhill.

For a long time the English were able to control India. Now India numbers 350 or 400 million people. At no time did the British army number

more than 75,000 British troops, the civil servants never more than 5,000, and yet they were able to rule an empire of 350 million. And they were forced to get out only because they were unwilling to use the brutal, ruthless, shooting-down tactics which you get with the Communists.

MR. HART: Again I fall back on the tremendous area of China, the different types of people occupying China, the enormous number of people in China. I feel that Russia cannot get China under her domination in the way that she has the satellite countries in Eastern Europe in time to do her the good that she expects. Europe, meanwhile, is getting stronger and stronger. It is not going to be possible for Russia to dump the countless millions of men and billions of dollars in industrial equipment and military equipment into China. China is a nation of small farmers who, when they wake up, even though they have no arms can do a tremendous amount of passive resistance. That is the basis of my optimism.

Communists Will End Open Door Policy

MR. McGOVERN: I wish again I could agree with you. I thoroughly agree with the numbers, but in India you had more diversity than in China. You have also seen how the Russians have been able to carry on their regime in Outer Mongolia, now a Russian satellite. They have now complete control of Manchuria—partly our fault, incidentally—and are now rapidly securing control over the great plains of China, which are the essential part of China from our point of view. It means, we will not be able under the Communist regime to secure the Open Door Policy in China. Don't forget that is one of the two fundamental things of our American foreign policy from 1899 or 1900 right down through 1948. Our basic policy in the Far East has been the Open Door Policy, equal opportunity for all, special privilege for none, including ourselves, and guarantee of the territorial integrity of China.

Now it means that the territorial integrity of China becomes nonsense, the special privilege for none becomes essentially the special privilege for one, and the equal opportunity is completely gone. We really fought the war of the Pacific primarily to maintain the Open Door Policy. It looks as though all of our sacrifices will have been in vain.

MR. HART: It looks as though we fought to get Japan out of China and now Russia is coming in. Still, I feel that for years to come the Russians are going to be just like the Japanese in China; they are going to be able to control just as far as their armed forces can reach out. I feel that the Chinese people are going to be a tremendous resistance mass.

Fighting China is like fighting a pillow. Every conqueror from Chingis Khan and Kubilai Khan to the present has found he can conquer only a small group at the top and exercise nominal control. The Manchus didn't rule China very much. And although conditions have changed and China has begun to be industrialized, I believe that Russia can't make the grade in China.

MR. McGOVERN: There is a very great difference between now and a few centuries back. In the old days—one hundred or two hundred years ago—one man with a rifle was a right important person. Therefore, the army with 1,000 people had a great deal of difficulty putting down 10,000 people or 100,000 people. Now with the development of aviation, modern bombing

techniques, machine guns, a handful of people, resolute and ruthless, can rigidly control. Power is more easily put into the hands of a small minority, well-armed and ruthless, than into the hands of a large, inchoate mob as a century ago.

MR. HART: Do you look to China being controlled by Russian soldiers or by Chinese soldiers indoctrinated with the Russian ideas? That is rather important.

MR. McGOVERN: Primarily with Chinese soldiers. I watched the satellite, for example, in Outer Mongolia. There are a few Russians, but you can go readily in and out without noticing them. The Russians are in control, but they are mostly behind the scenes.

Can Russians Rely on Chinese Soldiers?

MR. HART: Isn't that different in Mongolia and Turkestan in that the penetration by Russia was in peacetime? They did not offer the alternative between destruction and letting people alone. From what you and I know about the Chinese soldier, do you feel that the Russians can rely on Chinese groups once the Chinese soldiers feel that their interests are contrary to those of the Russians? Do you really feel that the Chinese soldier will fight for the Russians?

MR. McGOVERN: I only know about the situation as I see it elsewhere. Last year when I was in Korea I was amazed—and appalled in one sense—that the Korean Chinese Communists were perfectly willing to go along with the Russians, taking orders from the Russians. All the Koreans were anxious to do away with trusteeship. It was agreed that they were going to fight trusteeship until the Communists told the Korean Communists, "You will have to fight for trusteeship." The next day they began fighting for trusteeship.

It was astounding that people like the Koreans should give way to the central dictatorship of the Kremlin, but it is true. I don't think one per cent of the Chinese Communists know what Communism is about, but that doesn't affect the control by the small group at the top. The same thing is equally true in Korea, and equally true in Japan.

MR. HART: Don't you feel the Korean attitude was largely conditioned by the treatment from the Japanese during the time of the Japanese control, which really began in 1885 and was continued to the end of the war? My experience in Korea was that the ruthlessness of the Japanese brought the people to a point where they were perfectly willing to accept anything and to obey orders. Personally I never had a tremendous lot of respect for the Korean attitude toward government because the Korean didn't know what government was.

MR. McGOVERN: That is certainly true. But speaking of Korea reminds me of another important thing. Supposing the Communists are only able to control half or two-thirds of China, this territory is still the most important from the international trade point of view. If this should occur, imagine the tremendous handicap we are going to have in dealing with the Japanese, the Korean, and the Philippine situation. As you know, I was in Japan last year.

At the moment Japan is very friendly to us, and at the moment is a bastion

of pro-American sympathy and of sympathy for the other democratic powers. On the other hand, Japan will be in a desperate situation if China goes Communist or even if the larger part of China goes Communist. Economically Japan is part of the Far East. She must rely upon the imports and exports to Korea, to Manchuria, to China. If China or the largest part of China gets behind the Iron Curtain, it simply means that we will then have to rush to the rescue of Japan to save 80 million people from starvation.

All of Far East Is Involved

MR. HART: Don't you feel, then, the MacArthur Report has come at a very strategic time?

MR. McGOVERN: I think it is essential that the people realize it is true. The problem of China is not only a problem of China, but also of the whole of the Far East, not only Japan and Korea, but our responsibility to the Philippines. The Far East is in one sense an economic unit, and we must realize that if the Communists get control of China, the largest element of the Far East, it means we have to re-analyze our whole situation in Japan.

MR. BUCHANAN: Militarily it makes our situation rather untenable, according to the MacArthur Report. Do you think that is true?

MR. McGOVERN: Yes, militarily, although I think it is much more important economically rather than militarily.

MR. HART: Japan grew great because she had control of the wealth of Manchuria. Japan itself is deficient in the metals necessary for a modern nation and in the oils. She relied on Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa for her economic domination of East Asia. She relied on the Chinese market, the Indian market. She relied on other nations for her raw products, such as cotton and copper. Chinese Communist domination of the mainland opposite Japan is going to make it impossible for Japan to draw on China either to buy her raw materials or to sell her manufactured goods. Japan is in a very precarious position, whether she is inclined to democracy, which I personally doubt, or not.

MR. BUCHANAN: What has happened to the aid we have already sent to China, Mr. McGovern?

MR. McGOVERN: It is a question of too little and too late. That has been our trouble elsewhere, and more particularly in China. I thought even last year when I recommended that aid be sent to China that it should be sent under definite and rigidly-controlled conditions. Much of the aid we have sent has been simply flung down a rat hole, and simply pouring in another 1, 2, or 5 billion is not the solution.

MR. HART: Don't you think it is too late even to take advantage of the Wedemeyer Report, militarily, as much as we know of that report?

MR. McGOVERN: I am afraid it is now five minutes to 12:00, speaking metaphorically, and at noon the battle is over. I think last year, when Wedemeyer made his report, that something could have been done. But now I think the situation is almost hopeless. The only thing we can do is to take advantage of the fact that China is big and is broken up, and let us hope that before the Communists are able to get control over all of China that some

new group or groups can arise that we can support, not by vast sums of money, but in a practical way to re-establish government of China by the Chinese and re-establish the Open Door Policy.

Should We Let Chinese Alone?

MR. HART: Do you feel with me, then, the best thing to do is to pull out and let the Chinese alone? To see how the thing coagulates, whether there will crystallize a small group which we can back? At the present time, with the government of China in its chaotic condition, it is a waste of time, money and men to try to do anything to bolster the Chiang regime.

MR. McGOVERN: That is a little stronger than I would say. To wash your hands of the problem is a very different thing from waiting to see what will happen in the next year or so. I think it is now too late to bolster the Chiang regime. Also to wash your hands of the situation is very bad.

MR. HART: I don't mean to wash our hands completely, but at the present time stand back and watch developments. It is a time to mark time.

MR. McGOVERN: We have to have a period of watchful waiting. I think that much of the trouble has been the fault of the national government. Much of the fault of the national government has been our lack of cooperation and lack of insistence on control.

MR. BUCHANAN: Is there any indication that some other government which we could back might arise?

MR. HART: I don't believe there is at the present moment. I think the whole situation is too obscure.

MR. McGOVERN: It is too bad, but there is no middle group between the Communists and the Chiang group. There are thousands of these intelligent people who are not able to form what we could call a democratic bloc. And that is the real tragedy of China. I hope they will be able throughout the years to bring about a democracy which will be worthy of our support.





Suggested Readings

Compiled by the Reference Department,
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FAIRBANK, JOHN KING. *The United States and China*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948.

Explains the China of today and the possibilities of its future in terms of its history.

GRIGGS, THURSTON. *Americans in China*. Washington, Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1948. (Pamphlet No. 5.)

Reveals the divergent views within the Kuomintang which threaten disruption of the Nationalist Government and provides an excellent background for an evaluation of Marshall Plan aid to China.

PAYNE, ROBERT. *China Awake*. New York, Dodd, 1947.

For the reader who wants insight into both the Kuomintang and Chinese Communism.

SUN FO. *China Looks Forward*. New York, John Day Co., 1944.

The son of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen explains his father's political theories and urges that they will always be a firm basis for a free and unified China.

U. S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Economic and Political Conditions of the Far East*. WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, Special consultant on Far East problems. Washington, D. C., U. S. Superintendent of Documents, 1948. (U. S., 80th Congress, 2nd Session.)

American Perspective. 2:190-9, S., '48. "Political Factions in China." THURSTON GRIGGS.

Brief description of the Chinese political factions showing their loyalties with regard to the Chinese Communists, Chiang, and the Kuomintang.

Asiatic Review. ns. 44:423-6, O., '48. "China Problem Today." WU TIEH-CHEN.

Brief analysis of the Chinese political situation by the vice-president of the legislative Yuan.

Current History. ns. 15:88-93, 149-55, 193-8; Ag., '48. "Makers of Modern China." N. D. PALMER.

Studies of Kang Yu-Wei, Yuan Shih-Kai, Sun Yat-Sen—eminent Chinese who have greatly influenced present day China.

Nation. 167:563, Nov. 20, '48. "Chiang's Last Days."

Shows that all American aid to Chiang seems to end up in the Communist camp and suggests that the best solution for China lies in Chiang's early re-

tirement and the creation of a new government headed by one of the more progressive opposition leaders.

New Republic. 119:10, Nov. 15, '48. "Hope on the Horizon."


This report forecasts downfall for Chiang in the very near future and infers that the Chinese want a government not tied to the Kremlin or Wall Street.

U. S. News. P. 24-5, Je. 11, '48. "Decline of Chiang Kai-shek: Chiang Kai-shek, Symbol of Chinese unity, is having trouble holding China together."

Chiang's power is crumbling and only great amounts of American aid can save his forces.

Vital Speeches. 14:313-20, Mr. 1, '48. "China in Transition; Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Changes." V. K. W. KOO.

Discussion of changes in China.



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